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In the opening quote we witness judicial disavowal of the notion of the monster. The context for this utterance was counsel’s suggestion that Jodie and Mary, the conjoined twins in the case, might constitute a monster.​[2]​ This legal argument, along with others, was designed to support an application for medical separation of the twins.​[3]​ In particular, it sought to remove doctors performing such an operation from the possibility of a homicide charge.​[4]​ According to English criminal law, a homicide charge requires the prosecution to prove that the person killed was “a reasonable person in being.”​[5]​ If Jodie and Mary were to be viewed as a monster then there would be no reasonable person in being capable of being killed according to English law. In rejecting the argument that conjoined twins constituted a monster the court insisted that the concept of the monster was no longer part of English law. While recognising the existence of legal precedent for the opposite conclusion in the legal commentaries of Bracton, Coke and Blackstone,​[6]​ and therefore legal authority spanning six centuries, the court dismissed the idea that the notion of the monster might bear any contemporary significance. It would seem that in English law the concept of the monster is now, if it was not already, legally dead. 

This legal claim appears so axiomatic that one almost hesitates to call it into question. Yet, judicial insistence that the idea of the monster is nothing more than a relic of a less rational legal past should not perhaps be allowed to pass so readily. It will be argued that the legal idea of the monster offers to inform contemporary thinking in relation to outsiders. Of course, there are existing templates for thinking about the outsider. These include Carl Schmitt’s ‘enemy,’​[7]​ Zygmunt Bauman’s ‘stranger’​[8]​ and Renee Girard’s ‘scapegoat.’​[9]​ Each offers a valuable framework for thinking about the outsider. This article will argue that the figure of the monster might contribute something novel to contemporary debates in social theory that concern themselves with outsiders. As Bauman notes, “society can only define itself against its strangers.”​[10]​ It needs enemies or scapegoats. It needs outsiders to constitute itself. The figure of the monster might prove useful because it addresses not only this question of why outsiders are necessary, that is, sociologically and psychologically functional, but also, and in a particular way, the conditions necessary for producing outsiders. 

Drawing on the work of Foucault it will be contended that the process, whereby at least some human beings are positioned as outsiders, is structured like a monster. That is to say, at least some constructions or representations of human difference, both legal and non-legal, are informed by the monster category. The article will think through and unpack the idea of the monster, and the sufficient and necessary conditions of monster production. In the process, the article will identify two contemporary figures that bear the legacy of this legal category. These are the figures of Foucault’s abnormal individual and the human/animal hybrid of genetic medicine, figures that can neither be reduced to products of law or disentangled from its domain. An emphasis on the importance of the template of the monster in understanding these contemporary figures points to its relevance to legal scholarship within fields such as gender, sexuality and race, and bioethics respectively. 






While there is a great deal of literature on the subject of monsters,​[18]​ the terms monster, monstrosity and monstrousness are often used interchangeably and without distinction.​[19]​ Certainly, the precise relationship between these terms is rarely delineated. In speaking of monsters a considerable degree of conceptual precision is required. In thinking about the proper relationship between these terms two texts stand out as aids. These are George Canguilhem’s seminal work on Monstrosity and the Monstrous,​[20]​ and the more recent reflections on the subject by Foucault in his text Abnormal.​[21]​ In Canguilhem’s view, monstrosity and the monstrous “are a duality of concepts with the same etymological root” and are “at the service of two forms of normative judgment, the medical and the legal.”​[22]​ Accordingly, while Shildrick is correct to state that the concepts of the normative and the monstrous “remain locked in a mutually constitutive relationship,”​[23]​ this is no less true of the relationship between monstrosity and the normative. For Canguilhem the monster can be understood conceptually as an amalgam of these two forms of normative judgment. That is, the monster is a creature that is both a monstrosity, understood in terms of morphological irregularity, and monstrous, understood in terms of transgression of the law. On this account, Shildrick’s claim that “what is monstrous about [monsters] is most often the form of their embodiment”, what she calls their “aberrant corporeality,”​[24]​ misses the point. It confuses the duality of concepts Canguilhem identifies. For Canguilhem, what is monstrous about monsters is not the form of their embodiment for this constitutes only a breach of nature. Rather, what is monstrous about monsters lies in transgression of the law. 

Turning to Foucault, it is clear that he too comprehends the monster as an amalgam of the concepts of monstrosity and monstrousness. Thus in offering an account of the legal distinction between deformity and monstrosity, a distinction traceable to Roman law,​[25]​ Foucault notes that the monster represents “the transgression of natural limits” and that “this is actually what is involved in monstrosity.”​[26]​ Yet, “[f]or Medieval thought, and definitely for seventeenth and eighteenth century thought” he notes “breach of natural law is not enough to constitute” the monster.​[27]​ There must also be “an interdiction of civil and religious or divine law” for the monster appears “only when confusion comes up against, overturns, or disturbs civil, canon, or religious law”​[28]​ for “[t]he monster combines the impossible and the forbidden.”​[29]​ To put it differently, “the monster appears and functions precisely at the point where nature and law are joined” for the monster is “a juridico-natural complex.”​[30]​ The monster “is the casuistry that is introduced into law by the confusion of nature.”​[31]​ While deformity or disability “may well be something that upsets the natural order” it does not lead to the designation monster because:

it has a place in civil or canon law. The disabled person may not conform to nature, but the law in some way provides for him. Monstrosity, however, is the kind of irregularity that calls law into question and disables it.​[32]​ 






In thinking about the relationship between a breach of nature and a breach of law, a double breach both Canguilhem and Foucault consider necessary to the production of monsters, it is important to consider the relevance, if any, of the concepts of causation and responsibility. Canguilhem is clearest on this point. For Canguilhem, monstrosity cannot be divorced from monstrousness for the former term always implies the latter. That is to say, monstrosity is the effect produced or caused by monstrousness. For Canguilhem, monstrousness is to be found in the act or acts believed to cause monstrosity. For as he explains, monstrosity is: 

the effect of an infraction of the rule of specific sexual segregation and the sign of a will to pervert the tableau of creatures. Monstrosity was less a consequence of the contingency of life than of the licence of living beings. … Monstrosity occurred unexpectedly because of lack of discretion … the result of an animal’s carnival.​[35]​ 

It is clear from this passage that Canguilhem viewed the act of bestiality as the specific transgression of the law that culminated in morphological irregularity. Crucially, Canguilhem understands monstrosity as produced by, or as the effect of, this particular kind of monstrousness. For Canguilhem, monstrousness equates with a particular act and taboo. Moreover, on this account, it is not any transgression of the monster, but a transgression of the mother that constitutes a breach of law. Accordingly, responsibility for monstrousness and/or monstrosity cannot be accorded to the monster. In relation to monstrousness, responsibility lies with the female agent of monster production. As for monstrosity, it is merely the visible sign and evidence of the mother’s transgressive act.​[36]​ In this respect, monstrosity can be understood as the visible manifestation of monstrousness. This understanding of monstrosity finds support in the etymology of the word monster. Thus the term derives from the Latin word monstrare, meaning to show forth or demonstrate.​[37]​ 

The idea that causation and responsibility are significant elements in the process of producing monsters is one that finds support within English legal texts. Thus, in the context of the common law, it seems reasonably clear that Bracton, Coke and Blackstone all understood monsters through the lens of bestiality​[38]​ with the implication of maternal responsibility that this outlook entailed. The matter is rendered more explicit in the late sixteenth century canon law writings of Swinburne who devotes considerable attention to the question of parental fault in the context of the birth of monsters.​[39]​ Indeed, in the context of his human-bodied/animal-headed creatures, Swinburne insists on the culpability of the female parent.​[40]​ Conversely, in the context of other monsters, those whose bodies are merely excessive or not properly arranged, Swinburne entertains the possibility of blameless parents. Thus, he notes, that a finding that a creature was a monster would not operate to the detriment of parents who would otherwise benefit under a conditional legacy requiring issue, provided that the monster which “the father did beget, and the mother bring forth … cannot be imputed to their fault.”​[41]​ While it is self-evident here that bestiality is excluded as the monster’s cause, and while it is far from clear what other cause Swinburne imagined there could be,​[42]​ what is significant about this passage is the fact that the idea of the monster is, at least potentially, divorced from the notion of culpability. In other words, while the question of fault clearly animates Swinburne’s text where it is a source of considerable anxiety, the possibility remained that a creature designated monster lacked blameworthy parents. By the same token, the absence of a party to blame did not serve to preclude the designation monster. Accordingly, it would appear possible to think of the monster apart from questions of responsibility. 

Equally, it would appear possible to dispense with the concept of causation. It is precisely this view of the monster category that appears to characterise Foucault’s theoretical framework. Thus, in contrast to Canguilhem, Foucault does not appear to insist on a particular relation, and certainly not a causal relation, between the concepts of monstrosity and monstrousness. It is true that, like Canguilhem, Foucault places emphasis on the transgressive act of bestiality in explaining historical understandings of irregular bodies designated monsters.​[43]​ However, this element does not appear to occupy a central place within Foucault’s theoretical account. Rather, in contrast to Canguilhem who insists on a causal relationship between monstrousness and irregular bodies, Foucault appears more ambivalent regarding aetiology and related questions of responsibility. It would seem that Foucault’s conceptual framework requires only two conditions for the birth of monsters: a breach of nature and a breach of law. In relation to a breach of law the key thing for Foucault is not the monstrousness of acts, though this element may well be present. Rather, the essential point is that the body of the monster poses a challenge to legal certitude and taxonomy. It is precisely in this challenge that the element of monstrousness is most apparent. Thus for Foucault the problem of the monster is ultimately not one of causation or responsibility, but one of effects. Foucault’s monsters present a problem of classification. Nevertheless, as with Canguilhem’s account, monstrosity, understood in this way, can still be thought of in terms of the visible manifestation of monstrousness. For challenge to legal taxonomy is rendered visible by the irregular body. 

In relation to a breach of nature, or the element of monstrosity, Foucault again diverges from Canguilhem. As a result of understanding the concept of monstrosity exclusively in terms of morphological irregularity, and as the effect of monstrousness, Canguilhem is led to the conclusion that today “life is poor in monsters.”​[44]​ For with the development of science a view of bodily irregularities as having a monstrous cause could no longer be sustained. In other words, “[t]he transparence of monstrosity to scientific thought … deprives it of all relationship to the monstrous.”​[45]​ From the late sixteenth century, scientific discourse had gradually been removing the epistemological ground from beneath the feet of monsters. That is, from the writings of Ambroise Pare in 1573​[46]​ monsters were increasingly naturalised within medical science. Indeed, and as observed by Daston, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries understandings of monsters “swung from the almost-supernatural extreme of portents to the almost-natural extreme of Baconian facts.”​[47]​ This trend continued into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.​[48]​ Without monstrousness the monster is denied one of its constitutive elements and therefore on Canguilhem’s reckoning disappears. Conversely, because Foucault does not insist on a particular relationship between the concepts of monstrosity and monstrousness, beyond their co-presence, it seems clear that what is central to his account is neither monstrous acts or irregular bodies, but the fact of a double transgression, of law and nature. Crucially, while the irregular body provides a historically specific example of monstrosity, it does not exhaust this requirement within a law/nature conceptual framework. It is precisely this point that enables us to think about the legal category monster as one that informs the figure of the abnormal individual. By the same token, a view of the abnormal individual as a contemporary monster requires jettisoning a view of monstrosity as a visible sign of monstrousness. In developing these points we need to consider Foucault’s genealogy of the abnormal individual and to situate it within the context of his emphasis on a historical shift from body to soul as the object of legal concern. 


FROM BODY TO SOUL

In his genealogical account of the abnormal individual of the present, or his account of “a transition from the monster to the abnormal,”​[49]​ Foucault identifies three key ancestors: the monster, incorrigible man, and the masturbating child. According to Foucault “a technology of abnormal individuals appears precisely when a regular network of knowledge and power has been established that brings the three figures together.”​[50]​ On this account, the constitution of the abnormal individual is the effect of the systematisation, codification and linkage of three bodies of knowledge and power: natural history, pedagogical techniques, and the biology of sexuality.​[51]​ For present purposes, what is significant about Foucault’s genealogy is the manner in which he links the subject of contemporary regimes of normalisation to a series of antecedent figures, and in particular to the figure of the human monster. What needs to be emphasised is his contention that the legal category monster not only structures understandings of the human monster but also, albeit in diluted form,​[52]​ the abnormal individual.​[53]​ For the figure of the monster now functions as a “magnifying model … for every little deviation” and as “the principle of intelligibility of all the forms that circulate as the small change of abnormality.”​[54]​ 

In understanding the abnormal individual as a contemporary incarnation of the monster it is necessary to situate the abnormal individual in the context of a historical shift from the body to the soul as the target of legal regulation and to delineate the ways in which the double transgression, of nature and law, operates differently with the arrival of this figure. In effect, what Foucault charts in his genealogy of the abnormal individual is a shift in legal concern from irregular bodies to deviant identity. What he teases out is a change in legal focus from the externality of the body, its materiality, to the interiority of the mind. He understands this shift in terms of “a process that develops between 1765 and 1820-1830,”​[55]​ one to be accounted for by a transformation in “politico-judicial powers”​[56]​ and exemplified by a transformation in “the economy of punitive power.”​[57]​ 

This historical shift is perhaps best captured in Foucault’s treatment of the figure of the hermaphrodite. In comparing two French cases, the first in 1601, the second in 1765, Foucault notes the way that the concept of monstrosity is re-characterised.​[58]​ In each case a hermaphrodite had engaged in sexual relations with a woman. In the first case, the hermaphrodite, Marie/Martin Lemarcis, was banned from sexual relations “with anyone of ‘whatever’ sex.”​[59]​ S/he was banned from sexuality itself on account of her mixed sex. That is to say, it was the problematic nature of her body that registered with the court. In 1601 the body of the hermaphrodite was viewed as a monstrosity. By the time of the second case it would seem that the notion of “monstrosity as the mix of sexes, as transgression of everything that separates one sex from another” had disappeared.​[60]​ By 1765, as Foucault notes, “the hermaphrodite is no longer defined in medical discourse as a mixture of the sexes.”​[61]​ This is because in the intervening period the two-sex medical model had emerged to cast doubt on the authenticity of the phenomenon of hermaphroditism.​[62]​ Accordingly, Anne Grandjean was viewed as a woman who had transgressed sexually.​[63]​ Thus the concept of monstrosity was uncoupled from the body and became “simply an irregularity, a slight deviation.”​[64]​ However, this “irregularity” or “deviation” is “one that makes possible something that really will be a monstrosity, that is to say, the monstrosity of character.”​[65]​ It was in this fertile soil that the modern preoccupation with deviant identity or the abnormal individual took root. Later examples of this historical shift, provided by Foucault, include criminal man and the modern homosexual. Thus in contrast to criminal acts, the object of concern of classical criminology, Foucault points to the invention of criminal man within positive criminology.​[66]​ According to Foucault, criminal man “is a natural being defined by his criminality at the level of his nature.”​[67]​ The emergence of the modern homosexual in late nineteenth century sexological discourse charts a similar trajectory. In this particular context, the act of sodomy is superceded by the birth of a new species​[68]​ as the object of legal concern. 

What these examples point to is a fundamental shift in our understanding of the concept of monstrosity. If the abnormal human is a contemporary, though diluted, monster this cannot follow from an analysis of the body. Rather, while initially referring to the irregularities of bodies, the concept of monstrosity now also refers to the mind in the form of modern and deviant identities. That is to say, the concept of monstrosity has been displaced and reinstitutionalised and in the process its meaning has been transformed. Thus in relation to monsters of old the idea of monstrosity was quite literally written on their bodily surfaces. Here monstrosity equates with the horrifying spectacle of corporeal excess or disorder. Conversely, in relation to the abnormal individual we witness something different. Here monstrosity no longer signifies the body, but rather newly produced identity. What is sought within regimes of normalisation is, as Foucault notes, “the core of monstrosity hidden behind little abnormalities, deviances and irregularities.”​[69]​ According to Foucault, what we witness from the late eighteenth century on is “the emergence of a kind of specific domain that will become the domain … of a monstrosity that does not produce its effects in nature and the confusion of species, but in behavior itself.”​[70]​ In other words, in contrast to monstrosity written on the surface of irregular bodies, the abnormal individual’s monstrosity is of an invisible kind. In the context of the abnormal individual we witness the disappearance or rather the internalisation of monstrosity. That is, in contrast to monsters of old, monstrosity is no longer understood as the visible manifestation of monstrousness. It is precisely this fact of invisibility, where monstrousness is not shown forth or demonstrated, that constitutes the abnormal individual as a figure of modernity. Accordingly, in the context of the abnormal individual, the concept of the monster has become uncoupled from its own etymology. 

In contrast to the historical transformation of the concept of monstrosity, the concept of monstrousness remains relatively constant. It can manifest itself either through transgressive acts that possess taboo status or through challenge to legal taxonomy and order. In the context of the human monster this is a reference to the act of bestiality and to the fact that the conjoined twin, for example, problematises the idea of the proper legal subject as a single embodied mind or that the hermaphrodite and human/animal hybrid challenge respectively the distinctions between male and female and human and animal. In the contemporary context of abnormal individuals we might again take the example of the homosexual as instructive. Here monstrousness can be understood either in terms of the act of sodomy and/or as threat to the heteronormative gender order. 


GENETIC SCIENCE AND THE RETURN OF THE BODY

While there has been a historical shift from the body to the soul as the target of legal regulation, and while it is possible to think of the abnormal individual as a contemporary monster, law’s disavowal of the monster should not therefore be conceded in relation to the materiality of the body. On the contrary, and due to contemporary developments in genetic science, we live in a time when the older meaning of the term monstrosity, that of morphological irregularity, is perhaps reasserting itself in the guise of “genetic monsters.”​[71]​ Indeed, it may be that contemporary legal, and broader cultural, anxieties are being displaced onto these genetic figures and therefore onto the body as contemporary monstrosity. In this respect, we are perhaps witnessing not only a return to the body as the surface of monstrosity, as distinct from a modern understanding of monstrosity as interiority, but also a return to an understanding of monstrosity as the visible manifestation of monstrousness. Moreover, while contemporary legal and broader cultural concerns surrounding genetic monsters revolve around a variety of actual and possible biotechnological practices, including, human cloning, genetic engineering,​[72]​ and other forms of artificial reproduction, the life form whose possibility has generated the greatest alarm is the human/animal hybrid.​[73]​ For it is the potential for mixing human and non-human at the level of reproduction that arouses the greatest anxiety,​[74]​ a fact that provides a link with legal monsters of old given the prevalence historically of an assumption of bestiality. 

While legal regulation has lagged, and in many jurisdictions continues to lag, behind advances made in genetic science, several western jurisdictions have now legislated so as to either prohibit and/or control a variety of biotechnological reproductive practices.​[75]​ A notable feature of these legislative enactments is the outlawing of the creation of human/animal hybrids. Thus, for example, the Canadian Assisted Reproduction Act 2004 prohibits the transplantation of “sperm, ovum, embryo or foetus of a non-human life form into a human being,”​[76]​ the use of “any human reproductive material … that is or was transplanted into a non-human life form,”​[77]​ the creation of “a chimera, or transplant[ation of] a chimera, into either a human being or a non-human life form”​[78]​ and the creation of “a hybrid for the purpose of reproduction” or transplantation into “either a human being or a non-human life form.”​[79]​ In the U.K. the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, though less restrictive, prohibits placing in a woman “a live embryo other than a human embryo”​[80]​ or “any live gametes other than human gametes.”​[81]​ The U.K. legislation also restricts “placing an embryo in any animal.”​[82]​ While Canadian and U.K law allow human/animal mixing at the cellular level falling outside of these restrictions, and specifically for non-reproductive research purposes,​[83]​ it is clear that both jurisdictions aim, at a minimum, to prevent the birth or uterine development of human/animal hybrid creatures. Accordingly, while Foucault positions the human monster in terms of a genealogy of the abnormal individual, it would seem that this latter figure is not the end of a history that traces the monster into the present. For medical science, having formerly vanquished the idea of the human monster, appears to have breathed new life into this category. 

The re-emergence of the monster in genetic guise serves to raise a number of important questions. First, if genetic monsters, and the possibility of human/animal hybrid births in particular, provoke the appellation monster, as legal prohibitions suggest, how are these figures to be distinguished from morphologically irregular bodies no longer considered monsters?  The answer, no doubt, lies in the ways in which the meaning of breach of nature and breach of law are socially constructed in particular historical moments. Thus conjoined twins and hermaphrodites no longer lend themselves readily to Foucault’s idea of a double breach. In relation to the hermaphrodite, eighteenth century developments in medical science led to a rejection of a view of hermaphrodites as being of mixed or indeterminate sex. Instead, hermaphrodites were understood as being of one sex or the other within a binary division. The objective of medical examination was to determine the correct sex.​[84]​ Accordingly, the challenge that the hermaphrodite posed to the law of gender was muted. Conjoined twins, on the other hand, like contemporary human/animal hybrids, represent a breach of law as they continue to challenge legal taxonomy and order. That is to say, they continue to challenge the idea of the proper legal subject as a single embodied mind. Like hermaphrodites however, conjoined twins do not represent a breach of nature for they have been naturalised over time. Medical science has discovered their secrets, grasped their aetiologies and repositioned them within nature’s order. 

However, perhaps there is more to understanding how a category that resonates so easily with contemporary human/animal hybrids proves more problematic in relation to conjoined twins, hermaphrodites and other examples of morphological irregularity. After all, the human/animal hybrid, like the conjoined twin, does not represent a mystery to medical science. On the contrary, the processes by which it comes into being are well understood. It is precisely because of this fact that its emergence is possible. Accordingly, if we are to distinguish the human/animal hybrid from other morphologically irregular bodies that are no longer viewed as monsters, we should perhaps focus on something other than the transparency of bodies to science. 

While births of conjoined twins and hermaphrodites can be viewed as natural, though random, events this cannot so easily be said of a creature that begins its life in a laboratory and, in contrast to human forms of artificial reproduction, does not replicate the processes of nature. It is this fact perhaps that assumes significance. For the human/animal hybrid can be viewed as pure artifice, less an exception to nature than an interference with or corruption of it. In this respect, the emergence of contemporary genetic monsters redraws our attention to an issue that divides Canguilhem from Foucault, namely the relevance of the concepts of causation and responsibility to monster production. While Foucault does not view these concepts as essential to the monster category, Canguilhem insists that monstrosity cannot be divorced from monstrousness for the former term always implies the latter.​[85]​ Specifically, he insists that monstrosity was understood to be a consequence of the mother’s transgressive act of bestiality.​[86]​ Accordingly, causation and responsibility assume significance in understanding the production of monsters of old. For Canguilhem, it is precisely because we can no longer suspend our disbelief in a bestiality thesis that we can no longer designate as a monster those irregular bodies that nature throws into the world. 






This article has considered the legacy of the legal category monster. In particular, it has focused on two contemporary figures, Foucault’s abnormal individual and the human/animal hybrid of genetic science. It has been argued that both can be understood in terms of the structure of the idea of the monster. Dealing with these figures chronologically, the abnormal individual might be comprehended in terms of a double breach, of law and nature. While breach of nature was formerly understood exclusively in terms of morphological irregularity, the element of monstrosity can be viewed as present in the context of deviant or non-normative identities. While the abnormal individual is a diluted, or “toned down and muffled”​[87]​ monster, he is nevertheless a figure who bears the monster’s imprint. The difference is that monstrosity is no longer confined to the body. Rather, today the object of legal concern over monstrosity extends to human interiority or psyche. Accordingly, in the context of the abnormal individual, monstrosity no longer operates as the visible manifestation of monstrousness. Social constructions of non-normative identities as problematic cannot be divorced from a discourse and a category that precede and inform those constructions. In this respect the abnormal individual is always already an unnatural individual. It is toward a need to map the precise relationship between the (ab)normal and the (un)natural in constructions of abnormality that a study of the monster category draws our attention. 

In relation to the human/animal hybrid of genetic science, the monster category again helps make sense of contemporary anxieties. That is to say, as with the abnormal individual, legal concerns surrounding the human/animal hybrid are to be comprehended in terms of a double breach, of law and nature. As with monsters of old, contemporary human/animal hybrids challenge legal taxonomy. In this instance, it is the distinction between human and animal in legal classification that is disrupted. In relation to breach of nature, or the element of monstrosity, it exists perhaps, not in mystery but in knowledge concerning causation. That is to say, as with conjoined twins, scientists possess an understanding of the processes that lead to the creation of human/animal hybrids. Thus monstrosity does not arise out of a mysterious rupture in understandings of nature. Rather, in the case of the contemporary human/animal hybrid, it appears to proceed from scientific knowledge and deliberation. In other words, a breach of nature in this context can be viewed as the consequence of human interference. Accordingly, with the emergence of contemporary human/animal hybrid creatures we witness the return of an understanding of the concept of monstrosity as the visible manifestation of monstrousness. 

This observation about the human/animal hybrid of genetic science serves to draw our attention to the question of whether the elements of causation and responsibility are important to an understanding of the monster. While Foucault, contra Canguilhem, downplays the importance of these elements, the possible future creatures of genetic science add weight to the opposite conclusion. While perhaps not essential to the production of legal monsters, as Foucault suggests, a belief that human agency causes monsters appears to characterise both historical understandings of monsters, in the sense of bestiality on the part of the mother, and contemporary understandings of human/animal hybrids, in the sense of the interventions of genetic scientists. Accordingly, more attention should perhaps be given to these elements in future historical and theoretical study of the monster. 














^1	 * Andrew N. Sharpe, School of Law, Keele University. I would like to thank Professors Desmond Manderson of McGill University and Les Moran of Birkbeck College, University of London for their most careful readings of drafts of this article, for their constructive comments and for their generosity. Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 at 1054 per Walker LJ. For a general discussion of legal and ethical issues surrounding conjoined twins see S. Sheldon and S. Wilkinson, “Conjoined Twins: The Legality of Sacrifice”, Medical Law Review 5 (1997), 149-171. 
^2	  Id at 1025-1026. 
^3	  Id at 961. Counsel for the hospital also sought to rely on criminal law defences of duress, necessity and self-defence. 
^4	  Id at 1011. 
^5	  C.M.V. Clarkson and H.M. Keating, Criminal Law: Text and Materials 3rd edn (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1994), 594. 
^6	  Re A supra note 1 at 1026. See Henry de Bracton, On The Laws and Customs of England 1240-1260 vols 1-4 (trans. S.E. Thorne) (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968). References to monsters are made in vol 2, 31, 203-204; vol 3, 151, 221 and vol 4, 198, 227, 361 and 36. Bracton’s text can be accessed online through Harvard law school http://hlsl.law.harvard.edu/bracton/Common/index.html; Sir Edward Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England 1628-1644 (1832 ed) vol 1-4 (New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1979) vol 1 at 7.b; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vols 1-4 (1765-1769), Vol 2, Of the Rights of Things (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1979) Chp 15, 246-247). Blackstone’s Commentaries can be accessed online through Yale University’s Avalon project at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm 
^7	  C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
^8	  Z. Bauman, Postmodernity and its Discontents (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
^9	  R. Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). 
^10	  Z.  Bauman, “What Prospects of Morality in Times of Uncertainty”, Theory, Culture and Society 15 (1998), 11-22, 12.
^11	  D.1.5.14. See A. Watson (ed) The Digest of Justinian (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997). For a discussion of Roman law on monsters see E.J.H. Schrage, “Capable of Containing a Reasonable Soul” in R. Feenstra, A.S. Hartkamp, J.E. Spruit, P.J. Sijpesteijn & L.C. Winkel, eds., Colatio Iuris Romani Vol 2 (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1995), 469-488.
^12	  D.50.16.38; D.50.16.135. 
^13	  C.6.29.3. 
^14	  Bracton supra note 6. 
^15	  Blackstone supra note 6. 
^16	  While hermaphrodites were treated as monsters in some continental European jurisdictions, such as France (see, M. Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-1975 (London: Verso, 2003), 66-67; L. Daston and K. Park, “Hermaphrodites in Renaissance France”, Critical Matrix 1/5 (1985), 1-19), they were not considered monsters within English law. Indeed, English legal texts explicitly exclude hermaphrodites from inclusion within the monster category (Bracton supra note 6 vol 2 at 31; Coke supra note 6 vol 1 at 8.a; Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England or the Laws of England in their Natural Order According to Common Use (1724) (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1979), 12). While explicit statements to this effect suggest a degree of anxiety concerning the hermaphroditic body and its location with legal taxonomies, it is significant that a body that represented such a challenge to sexual difference itself remained outside the monster category within English law. This perhaps offers some insights for, as well as a provocation to, feminist theory.  
^17	  Henry Swinburne, A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills (1590) (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1978), 168-169.
^18	  See, for example, M. Neocleous, The Monstrous and the Dead: Burke, Marx, Fascism (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005); B. Bildhauer and R. Mills, The Monstrous Middle Ages (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003); D. Gilmore, Monsters: Evil Beings, Mythical Beast, and all Manner of Imaginary Terrors (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); M. Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the Vulnerable Self (London: Sage, 2002); E. Graham, Representations of the Post-Human: Monsters, Aliens and Others in Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); T. Beal, Religion and its Monsters (New York: Routledge, 2002); E. Ingrebretsen, At Stake: Monsters and the Rhetoric of Fear in Public Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); N. Lykke and R. Braidotti, Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist Confrontations with Science, Medicine and Cyberspace (London: Zed Books, 1996); D. Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Medieval Thought and Literature (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1996); J. Cohen, Monster Theory: Reading Culture (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1996); M.H Huet, Monstrous Imagination (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); A. Davidson, “The Horror of Monsters” in J.J. Sheehan and M. Sosna, eds., The Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines (Berkeley: California University Press, 1991), 36-67; K. Park and L. Daston, “Unnatural Conceptions: The Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England”, Past and Present 92 (1981), 20-54. 
^19	  See, for example, L. Lunger-Kruppers and J.B. Landes, Monstrous Bodies/Political Monstrosities in Early Modern Europe (New York: Cornell University Press, 2004); Shildrick supra note 18 at 9; B. Creed, The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1993), 43-58. 
^20	  Georges Canguilhem, “Monstrosity and the Monstrous”, Diogenes 40 (1964) 27-42.  
^21	  Foucault supra note 16.
^22	  Canguilhem supra note 20 at 30. 
^23	  Shildrick supra note 18 at 29. 
^24	  Id at 9. 
^25	  D.1.5.14. 
^26	  Foucault supra note 16 at 63.
^27	  Id. 
^28	  Id. 
^29	  Id at 56.
^30	  Id at 65.
^31	  Id at 64.
^32	  Ibid. 
^33	  Id at 65. 
^34	  Id at 64-65. 
^35	  Canguilhem supra note 20 at 30-31. 
^36	  The emphasis on bestiality as cause of monstrosity and on the role of woman in this conjugal act, as well as the alternative theory of the maternal imagination, whereby a pregnant woman’s thoughts were imprinted onto the body of her offspring, draw attention to the relevance of the monster category to feminist theory (see Graham supra note 18 at 52; R. Braidotti, “Signs of Wonder and Traces of Doubt: On Teratology and Embodied Differences”, in N. Lykke and R. Braidotti supra note 18 at 135-152; Huet supra note 18).    
^37	  J. Epstein, Altered Conditions: Disease, Medicine, and Storytelling (London: Routledge, 1995) 91.
^38	  Bracton supra note 6 vol 2 at 31, vol 4 at 361; Coke supra note 6 vol 3 at 59; Blackstone supra note 6 vol 2 at 246-247. See also G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) 21.
^39	  Swinburne supra note 17 at 169. 
^40	  Ibid.
^41	  Ibid. 
^42	  It is possible the idea of the maternal imagination (supra note 36) provided a reference point for understanding fault. 
^43	  Foucault supra note 16 at 64.
^44	  Canguilhem supra note 20 at 41.
^45	  Id at 38. 
^46	  A. Pare, On Monsters and Marvels (trans. J.L. Pallister) (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). 
^47	  L. Daston, “Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern Europe”, Critical Inquiry 18 (1991), 93-124, 112.
^48	  See, for example, S. Farr, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence (London: T. Beckett, 1788); I. G. Saint-Hilaire, Historie Generale et Particuliere des Anomalies 3 vols (Paris: J.B. Bailliere, 1832-1837); G. Gould and W. Pyle, Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders, 1897).
^49	  Foucault supra note 16 at 110.
^50	  Id. The scientific project of normalisation is one well documented by Foucault (M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic (trans. A.M. Sheridan) (New York: Random House, 1973); Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (trans. A.M. Sheridan) (New York: Vintage, 1977); The History Of Sexuality Vol 1 (London: Vintage, 1980); “The Dangerous Individual” in L. Kritzman, ed., Michael Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture Interviews and other Writings 1977-1984 (New York: Routledge, 1988), 125-151. 
^51	  Id at 62. 
^52	  Id at 57. 
^53	  Id at 324.
^54	  Id at 56. 
^55	  Id at 74. 
^56	  Id at 61. 
^57	  Id at 82. 
^58	  Id at 68-75.
^59	  Id at 72.
^60	  Ibid.
^61	  Ibid.
^62	  T. Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990) Chp 5; A. Domurat Dreger, Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2000).
^63	  Foucault supra note 16 at 73. The later nineteenth century case of Herculine Barbin provides a further example of this shift (see M. Foucault, Herculine Barbin: Being the Recently Discovered Memoirs of a Nineteenth Century French Hermaphrodite (New York: Pantheon, 1980). In his introduction to this text Foucault describes sexual irregularity as “belonging more or less to the realm of chimeras” (at x). 
^64	  Ibid.
^65	  Ibid.
^66	  Foucault, Discipline and Punish supra note 50.  
^67	  Foucault supra note 16 at 90.
^68	  Foucault, The History of Sexuality supra note 50 at 101. 
^69	  Foucault supra note 16 at 56.
^70	  Id at 74.
^71	  See F. Fernandez-Armesto, So You Think You’re Human? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) Chp 5; L. Cirlin, “Human or Animal: A Resolution to the Biotechnological Blurring of the Lines”, Southwestern University Law Review 32 (2003), 501-525 at 509-510; A.R. Smith, “Monsters at the Patent Office: The Inconsistent Conclusions of Moral Utility and the Controversy of Human Cloning”, DePaul Law Review 53/1 (2003) 159-203; C.M. Lo, “Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men”, Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 2 (2000), 247-286; B.E. Rollin, The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical Issues and Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of Animals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
^72	  See F. Fukyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (London: Profile Books Limited, 2002); Alain Pottage, “The Inscription of Life in Law: Genes, Patents and Bio-Politics”, Modern Law Review 61(5) (1998), 740-765. 
^73	  See Cirlin supra note 71 at 506-510; J. Marks, What it means to be 98% Chimpanzee: Apes, People and their Genes (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002); R.E. Fishman, “Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection?”, American Journal of Law and Medicine 15 (1989), 461-482). Contemporary anxiety over the possibility of a human/animal hybrid creature is perhaps exacerbated by the fact that the present era coincides with “a total animalization of man” (G. Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal (California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 77). According to Agamben, now that “traditional historical potentialities [of] poetry, religion, philosophy … have lost all political efficacy … the only task that still seems to retain some seriousness is the assumption of the burden – and the ‘total management’ – of biological life, that is, of the very animality of man” (at 77). 
^74	  A concern to distinguish human from animal is not confined to law or to the contemporary period. Rather, a concern of this kind operates on a broader cultural level and can be dated to at least the sixteenth century (see M. Pfister, “Man’s Distinctive Mark: Paradoxical Distinctions between Man and his Bestial Other” in E. Lehmann and B. Lenz, eds., Early Modern Texts in Telling Stories (Amsterdam: B.R. Gruner, 1992) 17-36, 21; K. Thomas, Man and the Natural World: A History of Modern Sensibility (London: Lane, 1983), 122). 
^75	  See, for example, Human Fertilisation Act 1990 UK; Assisted Reproduction Act 2004 Canada.  
^76	  Assisted Reproduction Act 2004, s. 4(g).
^77	  Id at s. 4(h).
^78	  Id at s. 4(i). The word Chimera referred originally to the ancient Greek mythological beast with a lion’s head, goat’s body and dragon’s tail (B. Evslin, The Chimaera: Monsters of Mythology (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989). Section 3 of the Canadian Assisted Reproduction Act 2004 defines chimera to include “an embryo into which a cell of any non-human life form has been introduced.” 
^79	  Id at s. 4(j). Section 3 of the legislation defines ‘hybrid’ to mean “(a) a human ovum that has been fertilized by a sperm of a non-human life form; (b) an ovum of a non-human life form that has been fertilized by a human sperm; (c) a human ovum into which the nucleus of a cell of a non-human life form has been introduced; (d) an ovum of a non-human life form into which the nucleus of a human cell has been introduced; or (e) a human ovum or an ovum of a non-human life form that otherwise contains haploid sets of chromosomes from both a human being and a non-human life form.”  
^80	  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 3(2)(a).
^81	  Id at s. 3(2)(b). A gamete is a sexual reproductive cell. 
^82	  Id at s. 3(3)(b).  In the United States, legislation to regulate the production of human/nonhuman life forms has not been forthcoming (N.E. Kopinski, “Human-Nonhuman Chimeras: A Regulatory Proposal on the Blurring of Species Lines”, Boston College Law Review 45 (2004), 619-666). However, applications to patent chimeras have produced a regulatory response. In 1999 the United States Patent and Trademark Office rejected an application claiming that chimeras containing up to fifty per cent human DNA are patentable subject matter. This patent application was brought by cellular biologist Stuart Newman and biotechnology activist, Jeremy Rifkin (the ‘Newman patent’). As Kopinski notes: “the objective was not to create the chimeras, but rather to secure the exclusive right to the technology for twenty years after the patent was granted, or, if the patent was denied, to reduce the economic incentive for others to develop chimeras (at 632-633). The PTO has maintained that it will not grant patents on human life or in relation to the processes that create human life (Kopinski at 633).
^83	  Id at s. 4(1)(c); Assisted Reproduction Act 2004, s. 11.  
^84	  Laqueur supra note 62. 
^85	  Canguilhem supra note 20 at 30-31. 
^86	  Ibid.
^87	  Foucault supra note 16 at 57.  
